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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and cross-respondent, Corporation of the 
Tridentine Latin Rite Catholic Church of Saint Joseph (the 
"Church") agrees with much of respondents' statement of facts. 
However, that statement must be clarified and supplemented in two 
important respects. 
First, by selectively extracting certain portions of 
the testimony of Deputy Charles Ellis ("Deputy Ellis"), respon-
dents attempt to give the impression that at the time he effected 
personal service of the summons and complaint, Deputy Ellis had 
no idea who he was serving. (Respondents' Brief at 7-8). That 
assertion is, however, belied by a full and fair reading of 
Deputy Ellis' testimony and that of the two individuals who 
physically witnessed his service of process. That testimony 
makes clear that as Deputy Ellis and the two witnesses moved up 
the driveway towards the front door of the Priory, they were 
observed by a member of the Schuckardt Group who was immediately 
and spontaneously identified by the two Church members as respon-
dent Horwath (Tr. 97, 98, 180, 181, 188, 189). It further 
reflects that Deputy Ellis identified himself to Horwath as a 
police officer, announced his intent to serve the summons and 
complaint and attempted to explain their contents. (Tr. 97, 98, 
180, 181). 
Respondents, however, seek to invalidate Deputy Ellis 
service of process by asserting the unremarkable fact that four 
years after he effected service, Deputy Ellis " . . .. could not 
describe Terry Horwath." (Respondents' Brief at 7). Respondents 
then claim that Deputy Ellis " . . . acknowledged that Mr. 
Horwath could have been any one of the people in the group and he 
had no knowledge of which one was Horwath." Id. at 8. That 
assertion, however, completely ignores the unchallenged testimony 
of Deputy Ellis during his redirect examination. That testimony 
is as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Anderson, legal counsel for the 
Church) Deputy Ellis, you indicated 
that apparently there was more than one 
individual standing behind the door [of 
the Priory], correct? 
A. They were in the doorway. The door was 
open and they were standing in the 
foyer, I guess you would call it. 
Q. And I believe you indicated in response 
to Mr. Lord's question, that Mr. Horwath 
could have been any one of those indi-
viduals; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But were you relying on what Father 
Pivarunas [one of the two witnesses 
observing the service of process] told 
you as to who Mr. Horwath was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that basis upon which you believe 
you served the papers on Mr. Horwath? 
A. Yes. 
Q* And that's so reflected in your return 
of service? 
A. Yes. 
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(Tr. 111-12)• Thus, there is little or no factual support for 
respondents' oblique suggestion that personal service was 
effected on any one other than respondent Horvath. 
Next, respondents attempt to create the impression that 
Deputy Ellis never informed anyone at the Priory " . . . that he 
had a summons or complaint, what the nature of the 'civil papers' 
were, or attempt to hand them to anyone at the door." 
(Respondent's Brief at 8). To support that remarkable assertion, 
respondents cite pages 99 and 123 of the trial transcript. Id. 
However, a careful review of those pages establishes that respon-
dents' reliance on page 99 completely ignores Deputy Ellis' 
testimony on pages 97 and 98 in which he explicitly stated that 
he informed those in attendance at the Priory that he was " . . . 
there for the purpose of serving civil papers." (Tr. 98). 
Moreover, respondents' reliance on page 123 of the transcript is 
disingenuous in that it reflects only the testimony of one of the 
individuals at the door of the Priory (respondent Krier) who 
testified that Deputy Ellis never told him " . . . what the 
papers were." Respondents can cite nothing in the transcript to 
support their claim that Deputy Ellis never informed Horwath of 
the substance of the papers that he attempted to serve. Indeed, 
it would be impossible for respondents to do so in light of their 
inexplicable failure to assure the attendance of Horwath as a 
witness at trial. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Substituted service of process is permitted under 
Washington law if it is impractical or impossible to effect 
personal service. Specifically, Washington law is clear that if 
a defendant cannot be found or has concealed himself so that 
process cannot be served on him, substituted service is suffi-
cient to acquire jurisdiction. In this case, the record clearly 
establishes that respondents Schuckardt, Belzak and Jacobs 
secretly removed themselves from the Priory to avoid service of 
process. As such, substituted service by personal service on 
respondent Horwath is valid. 
2. The Church's personal service of process on 
respondent Horwath complied fully with the requirements of 
Washington law. Specifically, Washington law does not require 
that the process server actually physically place the summons and 
complaint in the defendant's possession; rather, it only requires 
that the server attempt to yield possession and control of the 
documents while in a position to accomplish that act. Because 
Deputy Ellis sought to do just that, respondent Horwath's angry 
refusal to accept the proffered papers cannot invalidate service 
of process. 
3. In cross appealing from the District Court's 
refusal to quash service as against respondents Horwath, Gorbet, 
Krier and Boridin, respondents have failed to discharge their 
burden of marshalling all of the evidence supporting the court's 
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factual findings that they were validly served. As such, respon-
dents are precluded from obtaining any relief on their 
cross-appeal. 
4. Under Washington law, an abode once acquired is 
presumed to continue until the person asserting a change of abode 
shows through clear and convincing evidence that he has acquired 
a new and permanent abode. In their brief, respondents have 
completely failed to show any evidence in the record establishing 
their acquisition of a new "usual abode" on the date service of 
process was effected. As such, under Washington law, the Priory 
is presumed to continue as their usual abode, and substituted 
service at the Priory was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
them in Washington. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS IS PERMISSIBLE 
IN ANY SITUATION WHERE IT IS IMPRACTICABLE OR 
IMPOSSIBLE TO EFFECT PERSONAL SERVICE. 
The law is well settled that: 
"[substituted or constructive service of 
process, if authorized by statute, may be had 
where it is impracticable or impossible to 
get actual personal service. The right to 
resort to constructive service of process is 
based on the ground of necessity, and it is 
limited and restricted to cases where per-
sonal service cannot be had on a defendant, 
either because he is a non-resident or 
because, being a resident, he has gone out of 
the state, or cannot be found, or has con-
cealed himself so that process cannot be 
served on him, and the validity of statues 
providing therefor is generally held to 
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depend on the fact that the defendant, after 
due diligence, cannot be found in the state, 
62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process, Section 66, p. 846 (1972). 
The Washington courts have held that the issue of 
whether or not a defendant has concealed himself so as to evade 
process is a factual question. Bethel v. Sturmer, 3 Wash. App. 
862, 479 P.2d 131, 134 (1970). And, "a clandestine or secret 
removal from a known address appears necessary for concealment 
under the statute." Patrick v. DeYounq, 45 Wash. App. 103, 724 
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Wash. 1986). The rationale for granting a party 
relief from another party's concealment is that: 
In concealing himself, the defendant, by his 
own action, renders personal service of 
process impossible. This action constitutes 
a waiver of notice of the proceedings sought 
to be avoided. 
. . . 
To allow a person to escape his civil obliga-
tions by purposely hiding himself would be to 
encourage deception. 
Clark v. LeBlanc, 92 N.M. 672, 593 P.2d 1075, 1076 (N.M. 1979). 
In light of the foregoing principles, it is obvious 
that substituted service was justified: respondents Schuckardt, 
Jacobs and Horwath fled from the Priory at which they had resided 
for years to a motel in downtown Spokane w . . • for the purposes 
of safety and to avoid any confrontation," Tr. 33, and they 
purposely concealed from the Church any mention of their move 
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from the Priory to the motel (Tr. 55, 56). If ever there was a 
campaign of concealment, this is it. 
Moreover, the days preceding the attempt to effect 
service were punctuated by periodic exchanges of gunfire, verbal 
taunts and threats between the Schuckardt Group and other members 
of the Church. (Tr. 24, 32, 35, 36, 55, 56, 66, 69, 72, 75, 85, 
90, 91, 101, 113, 128 and 181). In the final analysis, both 
sides were acutely apprehensive of the threat of physical vio-
lence. Ld. As such, the process server's apprehension for his 
own personal safety and that of the Church members accompanying 
him established a compelling necessity for substituted service — 
service calculated to minimize the risk of bloodshed. As such, 
the substituted service effected by Deputy Ellis suffers from 
none of the infirmities suggested by respondents. 
Finally, there is no support for respondents' assertion 
that the trial testimony " . . . raises a reasonable suspicion 
that a deliberate attempt was made not to inform [respondents] 
that a law suit had been commenced against them." (Respondents' 
Brief at 17). That assertion is incredible in light of Bishop 
Schuckardt's own testimony that he " . . . had heard rumors of a 
complaint" having been filed against the Schuckardt Group, Tr. 
41, and that some three weeks after the summonses and complaints 
were served, Bishop Schuckardt issued a written decree excommuni-
cating one of the Church's members, the grounds for which was 
"summoning [the Schuckardt Group] before a lay tribunal, to which 
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there is attached an excommunication latae sententiae specifi-
cally reserved to the Holy See." (Trial Ex. P-4). 
Therefore, there is no support in the record for 
respondents' assertion that they were never apprised of the 
pendency of the Washington action. As such, they can mount no 
due process objections to the sufficiency of process. 
II • THE CHURCH'S PERSONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS ON 
RESPONDENT HORWATH COMPLIED FULLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF WASHINGTON LAW. 
Respondents contend in their brief that Deputy Ellis' 
personal service of the summons and complaint on respondent 
Horwath was defective in two respects: (i) that Deputy Ellis 
m
 • . . had no idea who he was serving" and (ii) that Deputy 
Ellis " . . . never actually tendered the [summons and complaint] 
to anyone." (Respondents Brief at 22-28). Those contentions are 
without merit. 
As demonstrated at pages 2-3, supra, at the time he 
effected personal service on respondent Horwath, Deputy Ellis was 
apprised of Horwath's identity and on that basis attempted to 
physically deliver the summons and complaint as he stood at the 
door of the Priory. Again, it is crucial to note that at trial, 
respondents never refuted Deputy Ellis1 testimony that he served 
respondent Horwath on the basis of the contemporaneous identifi-
cations made by two members of the Church and that he reasonably 
believed that service was being effected on Horwath. (Tr. lllr 
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112). That a process server would typically have no advance 
knowledge of the actual identity of the person whom he was 
seeking to serve is hardly surprising; respondents' efforts to 
attempt to exploit that fact must be rejected. 
Next, respondents suggest in their brief that personal 
service on respondent Horwath was defective in that " . . . at no 
time did he actually deliver or even tender the papers to any-
one." (Respondents1 Brief at 26). That assertion, however, 
completely ignores controlling Washington law that, to be effec-
tive, service does not actually require that the defendant 
physically receive the proffered papers. In the case of United 
Pacific Insurance Company v. Discount Company, 15 Wash. App. 559, 
550 P.2d 699 (1976), the court held that where one of the defen-
dants slammed the door, knocking the process papers from the 
server's hand, defendants were validly served and the court had 
jurisdiction over them. The court stated: 
The facts in the case at bench demonstrate a 
clear attempt by the process server to yield 
Possession and control of the documents to the defendant] while he was positioned in a 
manner to accomplish that act. Normal 
'delivery' thereof would have been effected 
upon [the defendant] except for her obvious 
attempt to evade service by slamming the door 
after the papers had been held out to her. 
The summons need not actually be placed in 
the defendant's hand [for service to be 
effective]. 
Id. at 701 (emphasis added). 
-9-
In the case at bar, personal service on Horwath and 
substitute service on the remaining parties was made by Deputy 
Ellis' offering the documents to Horwath and then placing them 
upon the p>orch of his residence after Horwath slammed the door. 
(Tr. 97, 98, 180, 181). In the words of United Pacific, Deputy 
Ellis clearly attempted to "yield possession and control of the 
documents to Horwath while he was positioned in a manner to 
accomplish that act.n Horwath's extraordinary effort to evade 
service of process by physically refusing to accept the proffered 
papers cannot serve as a basis for invalidating service. There-
fore, the district court properly concluded that personal service 
on Horwath was validly effected in conformity with Washington 
law. 
III. IN ASKING THIS COURT TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO QUASH SERVICE AS AGAINST 
RESPONDENTS HORWATH, GORBET, KRIER AND 
BORIDIN. RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO DISCHARGE 
THEIR BURDEN OF MARSHALLING ALL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THAT CONCLUSION AND THE FINDING ON 
WHICH IT IS BASED. AS SUCH, THEY ARE PRE-
CLUDED FROM OBTAINING ANY RELIEF ON APPEAL. 
Fewer principles could be better settled than the 
proposition that on appellate review the findings of fact and 
judgment of the trial court are presumed to be valid and correct 
and the heavy burden of establishing error rests with the appel-
lant. Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 747, (Utah 1982); Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 
1981). And, upon review, "this court views the evidence and all 
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the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light 
most supportive of the trial court's findings. Horton v. Horton. 
695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984). 
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not be 
set aside, and, if there is a reasonable basis in evidence, the 
findings will be affirmed on appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); 
Katzenberqer v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987). Findings 
will not disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence or unless it manifestly appears that the court 
misapplied the law to established facts. Brown v. Board of 
Education of Morgan County School District, 560, P.2d 1129 (Utah 
1977). 
The heavy burden imposed upon an appellant has been 
cogently expressed by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
It is incumbent upon the appellant to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and demonstrate 
even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the factual determinations made by the 
trial court, that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support its finding. 
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986). Accord, 
Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, respondents are seeking to challenge the 
district court's factual findings and legal conclusions with 
respect to respondents Horwath, Gorbet, Krier and Boridin. In 
doing so, however, respondents have nowhere set forth the evi-
dence upon which the district court based those determinations. 
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Thus, respondents have failed to even colorably marshall the 
facts and demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to their affirmance, they are clearly erroneous. There 
is, accordingly, no basis upon which those findings and conclu-
sions can be challenged on appeal. 
IV. RESPONDENTS HAVE COMPLETELY FAILED TO SHOW 
ANY : 
ACQU 
DATE 
EVIDENCE 
ISITION 
IN 
OF 
THE RECORD 
A 
SERVICE OF 
ESTABLISHING THEIR 
NEW "USUAL 
PROCESS WAS 
ABODE" ON 
... EFFECTED, 
THE 
AS 
REQUIRED BY WASHINGTON LAW. 
As the Church has demonstrated in its appellant's 
brief, an abode once acquired is presumed to continue until the 
person asserting a change from that abode shows that he has 
acquired a new permanent abode. (Appellant's Brief at 11-12); 
see also Northwestern and Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. Ridpathy 29 
Wash. €87, 70 P.2d 139, 147 (1902). In their response to the 
Church's brief, respondents have completely ignored this vital, 
dispositive issue. Their decision to do so is understandable in 
light of the fact that although each member of the Schuckardt 
Group testified that after his purported departure from the 
Priory, he moved to reestablish the religious order in Northern 
California, there is absolutely no evidence as to precisely when 
that move occurred. See e.g., Tr. 39, 55, 84, 124, 125, 152, 
153, and 158). Specifically, there is no evidence that as of the 
date the summonses and complaints were served — June 8, 1984 — 
any member of the Schuckardt Group had acquired a new "usual 
abode." 
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While the trial transcript reflects repeated references 
to this move, a careful review of those references discloses no 
indication that any member of the Schuckardt Group considered 
California or any other location his new usual abode as of June 
8, 1984. Therefore, under the Ridpath principle — that once 
established, an abode is presumed to continue until it is shown 
that a new permanent abode has been acquired — respondents have 
utterly failed to discharge their burden. As such, the district 
court clearly erred in failing to make any findings as to what 
the new supposed abode was as of the date service was effected. 
The district court further erred in concluding that respondents' 
usual place of abode was anything other than the Priory — the 
site at which they had continuously resided for the two to four 
years preceding service of process. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district 
court's findings that the Priory was not the usual place of abode 
of respondents Schuckardt, Jacobs and Belzak and enter judgment 
as a matter of law that substituted service on those respondents 
at the Priory was validly effected. On that basis, the Washing-
ton Judgment must be enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the Church's 
appellant's brief, this Court should (i) reverse the district 
court' judgment with respect to respondents, Schuckardt, Belzak 
and Jacobs, (ii) affirm the judgment with respect to 
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cross-appellants, Horwath, Krier, Gorbet and Boridin, and 
(iii) remand this case to the district court with instructions to 
enforce the Washington Judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1989. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
JohnvT. Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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